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Free Flows, Limited Diversification: Openness
and the Fall and Rise of Stock Market
Correlations, 1890–2001
Dennis Quinn, Georgetown University
Hans‐Joachim Voth, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ICREA, and CEPR
That international diversification is good for stock market investors is a
key result of modern portfolio theory. As early as 1909, Henry Lowenfeld,
in his Investment, an Exact Science, argued along similar lines. A long line-
age of papers demonstrates that international equity market correlations
arelowerthanindustrycorrelationswithinonecountry.Consequently,in-
vestors should be able to improve the risk/return profile of their portfolio
significantly if they put part of it into foreign equities (Grubel 1968; Levy
and Sarnat 1970).
At the same time, a growing body of literature shows that interna-
tional equity market correlations are not constant over time. The Econo-
mist (“Dancing in Step,” March 24, 2001) highlighted that stock market
correlations grew sharply in the 1990s. Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst
(2005) were among the first to examine return correlations over the long
run. They find major changes during the period 1860–2000. According to
their paper, the risk reduction achievable by sending funds abroad has
fallen from 90% in the 1950s to 65% at the end of the twentieth century.
Benefits can still be substantial, but they are much smaller than analysts
writing in the 1960s believed. Vanishing opportunities for diversification
have obvious implications for the “home bias” literature.
Why are equity market correlations changing over time? And why do
equity market correlations drop precipitously during the interwar
years,onlytoincreaseslowlyduringthepostwarperiod?Figure1shows
our explanandum. We plot both standard correlations and volatility‐
corrected correlations (using the Forbes‐Rigobon method) for a set of
16 developed countries. Our data set spans the whole period from the
nineteenth‐century heyday of global capital flows, across the period of
turmoilduringtheinterwarperiod,totherecent,gradualreturntogrowing
cross‐borderflows(Bordo,Eichengreen,andKim1998;Bordo,Eichengreen,
and Irwin 1999; Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). Independent of the measure
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978‐0‐226‐70749‐5/2010/2009‐0010$10.00we use, equity market correlations were modestly high in the period be-
fore World War I, fall to relatively low levels during the world wars and
interwar years (with a rebound during the Great Depression), and then
gradually increase until they reach unprecedented levels in the postwar
period.
A variety of interpretations have been suggested for this pattern,
fromincreasedtradelinkagestoincreasingcontagioninfinancialmarkets,
driven by changes in investor composition. There is a common view that
liberalized markets show a higher degree of comovement with world in-
dices (Bekaert and Harvey 2000). In an increasingly connected world, real
variables could start to move in unison as a result of greater trade, coor-
dinated policies, and so forth. Alternatively, growing specialization
could lead to growing divergence of economic cycles.
This paper argues that the liberalization of capital accounts was a
major causal factor behind growing return correlations, exploiting a
newextensionofalong‐rundatasetonpolicy‐inducedopenness.Weun-
dertake a comprehensive analysis of the fall and rise of return correla-
tions over the last century, using the first consistent, detailed data set
Fig. 1. Two measures of equity market correlations. Each observation represents the average
equity market correlation coefficient in a group of 16 countries, for 4‐year panels, 1890–2001.
The 16 countries in our data set are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States. “Uncorrected” is the equity market correlation of a
pair of countries and is taken from Global Financial Data. The Forbes‐Rigobon volatility
adjusted equity correlation is proposed in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and used here.
Quinn and Voth 8on capital account openness since 1890. Such long‐run data, we argue,
are crucial for determining the effects of policy for two reasons. First,
many papers in the liberalization literature focus on regulatory changes
atthefrequency ofmonths or,atmost,years.Implementation lags canbe
and often are long and variable. This may in turn obscure the true con-
sequences of new rules and regulations. Second, we have detailed infor-
mation on changes in openness. Over the last century, capital controls
often obstructed portfolio diversification. Policy‐induced segmentation
produced artificially low correlations of equity market returns. As con-
straints on investors declined and as regulatory rules governing capital
accounts converged—especially in the postwar period—share prices
began to comove.
Our findings have important implications for sustainable risk‐return
trade‐offs in international equity portfolios. First, the set of feasible di-
versification opportunities was always much smaller than simple anal-
ysis of correlations from the immediate postwar period suggests. Much
of the investment advice derived from the early studies on diversifica-
tion benefits could not have been followed in practice. Capital accounts
in Europe, for example, were largely closed to current and capital ac-
count transactions before 1959 and did not become fully open until the
1990s. Second, if greater openness itself is responsible for driving up
correlations, investors may be chasing a chimera of greater stability
by putting their money into overseas markets. While the benefits for
early investors may have been large, the benefits of international diver-
sification have declined rapidly as more and more capital moved over-
seas. When key investors switch from national to foreign, global factors
start to drive national returns. While some benefits remain, optimal in-
ternational investment diversification in a new equilibrium character-
ized by massive international capital flows may be less than what the
artificially low correlations of the 1950s and 1960s implied. The home
bias puzzle may therefore be less puzzling than many authors believe.
Investors often could not easily move their investments abroad; when
they did, returns started to move in lockstep.
Papers closest in scopeto ours are Goetzmann et al.(2005)and Bekaert
and Harvey (2000). Goetzmann et al. assemble a comprehensive data set
on equity return correlations over the last 150 years and analyze the
extent to which they have changed over time. The authors underline
the extent to which correlations are time varying. They also show how
theopeningupofadditionalmarketshasexpandedthesetofinvestment
choices.
1 Bekaert and Harvey show that correlations and betas increase
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 9after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies
from emerging countries in the recent past.
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Other papers also touch on the question of equity correlations and
financial openness. Dellas and Hess (2005) show that stock market syn-
chronization increases with the liquidity of equity markets and greater
financial depth. Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2005) examine correla-
tions over the period 1980–2003, finding no evidence of an upward
trend in correlations. De Jong and de Roon (2005) document that inte-
grationintoworldcapitalmarketsincreaseslocalmarketbetasrelativeto
the world index. At the same time, they find that the cost of capital and
expected returns fall by 4.5%, which suggests that diversification op-
portunities exceeded the increasing influence of the world beta. Carrieri,
Errunza,andHogan(2007)studyeightemergingmarketsandarguethat
correlations are an imperfect measure of international market integra-
tion.Theyalsoconcludethatliberalizationplayedabigroleinfurthering
integration for the period 1977–2000. Taylor and Tonks (1989) use co-
integration analysis to conclude that the U.K. exchange control liberali-
zation had no immediate impact on stock market correlations but led to
long‐runshifts.
3Hunter(2005)examinesArgentine,Mexican,andChilean
American depositary receipts. He demonstrates that, following liberaliza-
tion of capital markets in these countries, integration did not necessarily
increase; in some cases, it actually declined. If the increase in integration
immediately after liberalization does not necessarily last, we need studies
overthelongtermtodeterminehowchangesinpolicyarerelatedtoequity
market correlations.
Other related literature contains several important contributions. Time‐
varying market integration was analyzed by Bekaert and Harvey (1995).
Some recent studies find that international diversification benefits for
U.S. investors have not declined over the last two decades (DeSantis
and Gerard 1997; Lewis 2006). Ang and Bekaert (2002) argue that while
correlation patterns shift, diversification benefits are still substantial.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) find that increases in market in-
tegration take substantial amounts of time after an official change in pol-
icy and that different financial series imply different speeds of transition.
Brooks and Del Negro (2004) show that higher correlations in the 1990s
were largely driven by the effects of the tech bubble, and they conclude
that benefits of cross‐country diversification should still be substantial
afterthebubble’sdemise.The effectsofliberalizedcapitalflowsoneco-
nomic performance are analyzed by, among others, Henry (2000).
4
CoeurdacierandGuibaud(2004)arguethatshockstowealthandportfolio
Quinn and Voth 10rebalancing are responsible for growing comovements of stock market
indices.
Another closely related body of literature analyzes the extent of inter-
nationalcapital market integration overthe long run. Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003)arguethattheperiodsincethelatenineteenthcenturysawabroadly
“U‐shaped” pattern, with a trough in the interwar period and broadly
similar degrees of integration at the beginning and end of the twentieth
century. Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) examined equity market correlations
over the long run, but without an explicit link with policy variables.
Volosovych (2007) focuses on international bond markets during the
period 1875–2002. He employs principal components analysis to con-
clude that integration in the last period of globalization during the late
nineteenth century was markedly lower than in the last 20 years. Similar
dataandmethodswereemployedbyMauro,Sussman,andYafeh(2002),
who argue that contagion in modern‐day bond markets has become
much greater than it was historically. Bordo and Murshid (2006) find
the opposite, on the basis of their measure of currency crises.
We proceed as follows. In Section I, we describe the data sets on
opennessandonequityreturncorrelations,aswellasforthevariouscon-




systematic link between openness and returns correlations in our panel.
Then, in Section III, we subject the data to a range of robustness tests and
extensions. Finally, in Section IV, we discuss the implications of our find-
ings. Section V presents conclusions.
I. Data
We use a single, consistently defined measure of de jure capital account
openness—CAPITAL—for the period 1890–2001. Quinn (1997) and
Quinn and Toyoda (2007) derive measures of capital and current ac-
count openness for the postwar period from the International Monetary
Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, based on a coding of the
legal provisions governing international financial transactions.
5 To create
a measure of capital account openness over the long term (1890–1938),
Quinn (2003) used the coding rules described in Quinn (1997) and as data
sourcesLeagueofNations(1923,1922).Theinformationinthesesourcesis
supplemented by Einzig (1934), Ellis (1939, 1940), IMF (1949), and Palyi
(1972). We employ data for 16 of the countries in the sample.
6 The
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 11Quinn‐Toyoda measures of capital account and current financial account
openness are widely used in empirical studies in finance and economics.
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CAPITAL measures if capital payments can be received from abroad
or sent abroad without restrictions, how likely permissions are to be
granted, and if direct and portfolio investment is curtailed. It is therefore
a composite of de jure and de facto restrictions on capital flows. It is a
morefinelygradedmeasureof openness thanthedichotomous variables
compiled by the IMF itself (which requires an all‐or‐nothing decision
about when a country should be counted as “closed”). Openness on this
measurevaries from 0 (completely closed) to 100 (no restrictions). Values
below 50 generally indicate that international capital transactions are
highly restricted.
To fix ideas, we briefly describe how the data were coded with respect
to securities in two prominent cases. We take Britain and France in 1965
asillustrative.Britishcontrolsonpotentialcapitalflowsinthe1960swere
extensive. The IMF (1965) noted the web of British regulations and re-
strictionsondirectandportfolioinvestments.Inparticular,therulesgov-
erning transfers of securities between U.K. residents and nonresidents
wereextensive and weretargeted at (a) inwardportfolio flows especially
and (b) forcing settlements in currencies other than sterling:
[While] transactions in securities of all types may be carried out
freely between residents of the United Kingdom … permission is re-
quired for all transfers of securities in the United Kingdom in which
a nonresident is involved as either transferor or transferee, but most
transferors are covered by a general authority.
Nonresidents … may buy any securities on a recognized stock ex-
change in the United Kingdom [but only] against payment from an
External Account; against payment from a Blocked Account, they
may buy most sterling securities. Securities so purchased may be ex-
ported from the United Kingdom. Foreign currency securities may
be sold by nonresidents on a stock exchange in the United Kingdom
for settlement only in foreign currency. In no circumstances may settle-
ment be in sterling. (IMF 1965, 549)
Nonresident access to the U.K. securities markets for capital raising
was also controlled through a permit system:
Foreign‐owned firms and foreign individuals must obtain Treasury
permission in order to raise capital in the United Kingdom, and U.K.
resident subsidiaries of foreign companies are required to obtain con-
sent from the Treasury before borrowing in the United Kingdom or be-
fore issuing shares or other securities to nonresidents. Such permission
Quinn and Voth 12isfreelygivenforborrowingforthepurposeoffinancingthecompany’s
day‐to‐day business, but is not normally given for any expansion of
manufacturing capacity except for companies whose activities are
regarded as bringing special advantages to the U.K. economy.
Similarly,residentsfacedsignificant(butfewer)restrictionsonthe sources
of funds for outward portfolio purchases:
Residents of the United Kingdom may make capital transfers without
restrictiontootherSterlingAreacountries,exceptHongKong(seesec-
tiononExchangeControlTerritory,above).Allcapitaltransfersbyres-
idents to countries outside the Sterling Area require approval.… The
purchase of foreign currency securities outside the Sterling Area must
also be financed with investment currency or, in some cases, by long‐
term borrowing outside the Sterling Area. (548)
The permission requirements for nonresident securities purchases,
the restrictions on uses and sources of funds by nonresidents, and the
general restrictions on the currency used in settlements for nonresident
transactions amount to extensive inward restrictions. Outward flows,
while still restricted, were affected less by onerous restrictions. Britain
in 1965 receives a CAPITAL score of 37.5 (out of 100), which implies ex-
tensive controls of the form of investments and the way they can be paid
for.
France in 1965 was, in contrast, much less restrictive. The IMF noted
that Securities may be imported and exported freely through autho-
rizedbanksasfollows:importedonbehalfofresidentsornonresidents,
exported on behalf of nonresidents …, or exported on behalf of resi-
dents for the purpose of selling the securities in accordance with the
regulations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Dealings in secu-
rities on a spot or forward basis may be made in France by all non-
residents.Residentsmaycarryoutspotforwardtransactionsinsecurities
on foreign stock exchanges. (199)
Nonresidents,inparticular,hadfewerrestrictionsonsecuritiesandother
investments in France compared to Britain:
Issues of securities in France by nonresidents require the approval of
the Ministry of Finance.… [But] within the limits described below,
nonresidents may freely make investments in France and deal in se-
curities in France. They are permitted to repatriate the proceeds ac-
cruingfromtheliquidationofapprovedinvestmentsandfromthesale
of their securities in France. (197)
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 13In general, “nonresidents may freely make direct investments in France
and deal in securities in France” (198). France, in 1965, received a score
of 75 (out of 100), which implies moderate controls.
Figure 2 shows the development of average openness and the distri-
bution within the sample. At the end of the nineteenth century, openness
is high, approaching the maximum of 100 in many cases. Over the twen-
tieth century, it follows the U shape identified by Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003) for the globalization of capital markets overall. World War I sees
asharpdecline,followedbyarecoveryintheinterwarperiodpriortothe
Great Depression. After 1929, capital openness declines rapidly and falls
to low levels just after World War II.
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The postwar period shows two periods of liberalization—one imme-
diatelyaftertheendofhostilities,withaverageopennessrecoveringtoap-
proximately 75 by the early 1960s. The second liberalization wave started
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and continued more or
Fig. 2. Average capital account openness, 1890–2001 (line), with dots indicating the
pairwise capital account openness for each country pair in the sample. The line connects
median capital account openness in our sample of 16 countries. Each circle represents
openness for a country in our sample during nonoverlapping 4‐year periods, 1890–2001.
The 16 countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United States. Capital account openness measures the intensity of regulatory
restrictions on capital movements between a pair of countries and is from Quinn (2003)
and is extended here. The measure is scaled 0–100, with larger values indicating greater
openness.
Quinn and Voth 14less unchecked until the end of our sample period. By the end of the
twentieth century, openness was as high as it had been at the end of the
nineteenth.
In principle, there are two strategies available to researchers inter-
ested in equity return correlations over the long term: using all avail-
able markets, with shifting sample composition over time, or focusing
on a (much smaller) subset of indices in continuous observation over
the very long run. Goetzmann et al. (2005) mainly use a stable set of
markets for which data for the past century are available. We follow
a similar approach, favoring consistency and ease of interpretation over
breadth of coverage, and focus on our set of 16 countries for which we
have almost uninterrupted data series spanning the period 1890–2001.
We calculate the returns as monthly log differences of the main coun-
try return indices, taken from Global Financial Data (https://www
.globalfinancialdata.com/).
9 Correlations are derived for 29 nonoverlap-
ping 4‐year periods from 1890 to 2006. With 16 countries, we can draw
on 120 country pairs for each time period. This gives us a theoretical
maximum of 3,480 observations. Because of missing observations, our
data set contains a total of 2,263 observations. Table 1 summarizes the
main statistics. Real return correlations in our data set range from −0.48
to 0.905, with an average of 0.31. Corrected for the Forbes‐Rigobon bias,
the mean falls to 0.16, and the maximum correlation is 0.78.
To control for changes in the comovements of fundamentals, we use
data on GDP growth, interest rates, and trade. From Maddison’s (2002)
GDP figures, we derive growth correlations. The accuracy and reliabil-
ity of his figures have been questioned. Discussion mainly centers on
Maddison’s use of price indices (Prados de la Escosura 2000). Given that
no comprehensive alternative data series are available and the majority
of researchers accept the Maddison figures as a starting point, we use
them for our analysis. In the spirit of Bracker, Docking, and Koch
(1999),toexamineotherreallinkages,weemploytheBarbieri(2002)data
set on trade volumes to derive bilateral trade intensity. To control for
other financial shocks that might drive equity return correlations, we in-
cludedataon10‐yeargovernmentbondyields,takenfromGlobalFinancial
Data. Interest rates are highly correlated—with an average coefficient of
0.4. The range extends from −0.99 to 0.99.
Equity market correlations were initially modest but rose from
around 0.1 to 0.2 by the outbreak of World War I (fig. 3). They appear to
have more of a “J shape,” similar to the pattern identified by Volosovych
(2007). Together with the resumption of free capital flows in the interwar
period, they rose in the second half of the 1920s and peaked during the
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 15GreatDepression.Duringthe1930s,theyfelltolowlevels,bottomingout
intheperiod1942–45.Thepostwarperiodsawarecoveryandafirstpeak
after the end of Bretton Woods. From the late 1980s, correlations jumped
up, reaching levels of 0.5 and above for the past two decades.
As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) demonstrate, measured correlations
are affected by the volatility of returns. For the volatility suffered by in-
vestors in their portfolio, the uncorrected measure matters. We use the











it is the uncorrected correlation, and δit is the increase in the variance of
thereturnsinany4‐yearintervalrelativetotheperiodwiththeminimum
variance. In effect, ρit is a scaled‐down version of ρu
it, with the magnitude






Capital account openness (CAPITAL) 69.328 72 23.323 2,263
Return correlation
a (return) 31.023 29.602 23.784 2,263
FR corrected return correlation
a (returnfr) 16.257 13.253 15.415 2,263
Growth correlation
a (growth) .188 .291 .577 2,263
Interest rate correlations (interest) .393 .532 .482 2,263
Income differences (IncDif) .642 .565 .456 2,263
Bilateral trade/gdp (bitrade) .019 .009 .029 2,165
Trade volume/GDP (trade) .004 .001 .008 1,061
Note: These data are descriptive statistics for 120 country pairs, observed for nonoverlap-
ping 4‐year periods, during 1890–2001. The 16 countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Capital account openness
measures the intensity of regulatory restrictions on capital movements between a pair of
countries and is from Quinn (2003) and extended here. The measure is scaled 0–100, with
larger values indicating greater openness. “Return correlation” is the equity market corre-
lation of a pair of countries and is taken from Global Financial Data. The Forbes‐Rigobon
volatility‐adjusted equity correlation is proposed in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and used
here. We use Maddison’s (2002) GDP figures to compute pair growth correlations and na-
tional income differences. The Barbieri (2002) data set on trade volumes is used to derive
bilateral trade intensity and average total trade volumes. Interest rate correlations are the
pair’s correlation on 10‐year government bond yields, taken from Global Financial Data.
aIndicates that the variable was multiplied by 100.
Quinn and Voth 16returns relative to a base period. Since the correction is not without diffi-
culties, we will examine both the corrected and uncorrected measures.
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Figure 1 contrasts the simple and Forbes‐Rigobon corrected series of
correlations. The key finding is that, once corrected, equity market cor-
relations in our set of 55 country pairs do not increase much between
the early 1900s and the late 1980s. With the exceptions of two dips dur-
ing the 1920s and the 1940s, share price correlations are broadly stable
over almost a century. Higher correlations during the Great Depression
are largely driven by the rise in volatility. Much of the increase in sim-
ple correlations after the 1970s is also the result of higher volatility and
does not signal an increase in equity market interdependence. The rise in
the late 1980s, however, is obvious in both series. The final four 4‐year
periodscontainthehighestaverageobservedlevelsofequitymarketcor-
relations during the entire period, for both the Forbes‐Rigobon corrected
and uncorrected series.
Fig. 3. Average capital account openness and equity market correlations, 1890–2001,
by country pair. These data are the averages for capital account openness and equity
market correlations for dyads in our sample, 1890–2001. The 16 countries are Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The pairing
of these 16 countries yields 120 unique country pairs. Capital account openness measures
the intensity of regulatory restrictions on capital movements between a pair of countries
and is from Quinn (2003) and is extended here. The measure is scaled 0–100, with larger
values indicating greater openness. “Return correlation” is the equity market correlation
of a pair of countries and is taken from Global Financial Data.
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 17Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables in our
data set. Table 2 gives pairwise correlation coefficients. Most variables
are highly correlated with each other. In particular, capital account
openness is highly and positively correlated with return correlations,
corrected and uncorrected. The correlation coefficient of growth rates is
also significantly higher where capital accounts are more open, but the
coefficient is not large (0.09). This suggests that fundamentals may be
more synchronized in country pairs that allow for free capital flows—
an issue to which we will return later. Greater openness to trade, and
more bilateral trade, also seem to go hand in hand with a more open
capital account and with higher return correlations.
II. Results
What explains the fall and rise of equity market correlations over the last
century? Using uncorrected as well as Forbes‐Rigobon corrected correla-
tions as indicators of interdependence between markets, we examine if
changes can be explained by policy‐driven openness on the one hand
and by fundamentals on the other. Results suggest that both factors play
a role but that the impact of regulation‐induced financial openness is
stronger.Beforeanalyzingourdataforthelastcenturyasawhole,wefirst
return to our earlier case study of France and the United Kingdom to ex-
amineinmoredetailthesecountries’regulatoryregimeinthepostwarera.
A. Case Study
During the period 1958–61, equity return correlations between the
United Kingdom and France were a mere 0.2 (uncorrected, and 0.17
Table 2
Pairwise Correlations
CAPITAL Return Returnfr Growth Interest IncDif Bitrade Trade
CAPITAL 1
Return .492* 1
Returnfr .332* .81* 1
Growth .093* .1* .082* 1
Interest .213* .239* .214* .064* 1
IncDif .112* −.066* −.084* −.078* −.036 1
Bitrade .228* .251* .200* .124* .152* .167* 1
Trade .270* .338* .209* .049* .170* −.141* .569* 1
Note: The pairwise correlations of the variables listed in table 1 are reported here. See
table 1 for definitions and descriptive statistics.
*Significant at the .05 level or beyond.
Quinn and Voth 18Forbes‐Rigobon corrected). This should have made it highly attractive
for U.K. investors to buy French equities, and vice versa. Yet, average
capital account openness was low. In 1965, for example, for CAPITAL,
the scoresare75for Franceand37.5forBritain, foranaverageof56.25.A
detailedlookattheregulationinplacein1965suggeststhatBritishinves-
torscouldnothaveeasilypurchasedFrenchshares,andFrenchinvestors
could not have easily invested in Britain. The potential portfolio diversi-
fication that beckoned on the other side of the channel was real enough,
but tight rules on permissible transactions provided a very effective bar-
rier to actual flows for the British side.
By the late 1960s, with the Bretton Woods System under increasing
strain, France tightened its rules on capital account transactions: open-
ness in France declined in 1966–69 to 62.5. Combined with a score of 44
fortheUnitedKingdom,theaveragedecreasedto53.Outcomemeasures
such as the spread between domestic and external interest rates suggest
that tightening regulations led to increasing market segmentation. The
gap between internal and Euromarket interest rates for instruments
denominated in pounds and francs became substantial and persisted
during this period of tightening capital controls. Between December
1971 and May 1979 (the date of Margaret Thatcher’s election), the corre-
lationbetweenmonthlyexternalandinternalsterlinginterestrateinstru-
ments was only 0.3. For France after Bretton Woods, the correlation
between domestic and external interest rates was even lower: 0.09
(Quinn and Jacobson 1989). As we would expect if policy‐driven open-
ness was a key determinant of equity market correlations, correlations
between the two markets fell to a mere 0.12.
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It was not until 1979, when Britain under Thatcher abolished many
regulations restricting the free market, that the capital account was fully
liberalized (achieving a perfect score of 100). The Conservatives came to
power after the May 3 election: by July 18, the Thatcher government
had abolished all controls on direct investment and eased or eliminated
most restrictions on portfolio investment, including the onerous “115 per-
cent cover … for overseas portfolios financed by foreign currency”
(IMF 1980, 422). On October 23, 1979, “the Government announced the
removal of all remaining exchange controls. … Portfolio investments
were wholly freed, as was dealing in gold. The requirement that foreign
currency securities be deposited with authorized institutions was abol-
ished”(422). After 1979, the correlation between domestic and Eurosterling
interest rate changes rose to 0.96. This suggests that British capital markets
were much more integrated with global capital markets than they had
been. At the same time, following the Thatcher reforms, equity market
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 19correlations for the CAC‐40 and the FTSE‐100 also jumped—but only to
0.4 in the period 1982–85, in part because of tightened capital account re-
strictions by the Socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand.
France, in this instance, changed relative position from leader to laggard
in financial openness. It was only during the run‐up to Economic and
MonetaryUnion(EMU)thattheFrenchcapitalaccountwasopenedcom-
prehensively. By 1990,France had a score of 87.5,indicatinga lowdegree
of restriction overall. Return correlations between the British and French
indices reached 0.71 (and 0.59 Forbes‐Rigobon corrected).
B. Main Results
As a first pass through the argument, we use the mean correlation co-
efficient and capital account openness over the longest period for each
country pair. If the argument that policy‐induced openness systemati-
cally leads to higher correlations is right, we should find that country
pairs that maintained relatively open capital accounts should show
much greater comovement of equity returns. Figure 3 suggests that
our hypothesis receives qualified support from the data. At values be-
low 60, return correlations are around 0.2 or so. As capital flows be-
come easier, correlations increase. Above 80, they generally exceed 0.4.
Capital account openness did not just differ between country pairs; it
also changed dramatically over time. To obtain our main results, we use
both sources of variation. We estimate models of the type
ρi;t ¼ ai þ βQi;t þ γX′ i;t þ ε; ð2Þ
where ρi,t is the correlation coefficient (corrected or uncorrected) for
country pair i at time t, a is a pair‐specific intercept, Q is the capital‐
account‐related measure of openness, and X′ is a vector of controls. Es-
timating with fixed effects ensures that confounding factors that may
simultaneously produce high values foropenness and for return correla-
tions in a particular country pair are not responsible for our results. As
part of our robustness checks, we also estimate with period dummies.
Table 3, model 1, presents the results with uncorrected correlations as
the dependent variable, using no time or country dummies. A 1% in-
crease in capital account openness raises correlations of equity markets
by 0.5%; a 25‐point change in this 0–100 variable predicts an increase in
equity market correlations of 12.5%, or 0.125 points in equity correla-
tions on the original scale. As we add pair fixed effects (model 2), the
coefficient on Q falls slightly but remains highly significant. When we
Quinn and Voth 20use country and period dummies, the coefficient declines markedly, to a
third or less of the size estimated in models 1 and 2. Yet even if a large
share of the variation over time and in the cross section is absorbed by
fixed effects, capital account openness emerges as an important and
large predictor of changes in equity market correlations.
In models 4–6, we use the Forbes‐Rigobon (FR) corrected returns as
the dependent variable. Capital account openness is also a significant
predictor of correlations. As the FR corrected correlations vary less,
the coefficient on Q declines in magnitude. A 25‐point increase in open-
ness predicts an increase of FR correlations by 1.75 to a 5.5% increase in
FR correction correlations. An obvious concern is that we may be simply
picking up the effect of other, more important variables that changed in
the same way over time and in the dyads in our sample. In table 4, we
control for these factors. We add growth rate correlations in models 1–7
to takethemostbasic offundamentals into account. Growth ratecorrela-
tions are close to standard levels of significance when included on their
own (model 1). Combined with other proxies for correlated fundamen-
tals, they do not emerge as consistently significant. Bilateral trade, on the
Table 3
Financial Openness and Stock Market Correlations (Dependent Variable: Standard
































Pair fixed effects N Y N N Y N
Country dummies N N Y N N Y
Period dummies N N Y N N Y
Adjusted R
2 .24 .32 .51 .11 .33 .35
Note: We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of capital account openness’s
effect on the correlation of equity market returns for a pair of countries. The dependent vari-
ableiseitherthecorrelationofthereturnsbetweenapairofcountries’equitymarkets(return)
or the correlations adjusted for volatility using the Forbes‐Rigobon correction (return‐FR).
t‐statisticscomputed frompanel‐correctedstandard errors areinparentheses below thecoef-
ficients (see Beck and Katz 1995). Sixteen countries in 120 country pairs totaling 2,263 obser-
vations constitute the sample. The observations are nonoverlapping 4‐year averages of the
data,1890–2001.Models1and4arerandomeffectsmodels;models2,3,5,and6containpair,
period,orcountryuniteffects.Thecoefficientestimatesofthepair,period,andcountrydum-
mies are not reported to save space but are available from the authors. Hausman tests (not
reported here) strongly reject the use of random effects in favor of pair fixed effects.
*p‐value < .05.
**p‐value < .01.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23otherhand, emergesas an important and statisticallysignificant predictor
of correlations. These findings are in line with the results by Lane and
Milesi‐Ferretti(2004),whoshowthatcross‐bordercapitalflowsare higher
betweencountriesthattrademorewitheachother.Tradeexposureoverall
is also a good predictor of correlations, but it is not significant in all spe-
cifications. When we use country and period dummies and use the full
vector of controls, we do not obtain a statistically significant coefficient
for the trade variables. The same is true of interest rate correlations. Na-
tional income differences in general predict lower correlations between
equity indices, but again, the effect is not significant in all specifications.
In contrast, what emerges as consistently significant is Q—capital ac-
count openness. The estimated effects range between 0.11 and 0.5 and
are highly statistically significant in all specifications.
In panel B of table 4, we use FR corrected correlations. Again, the esti-
matedeffectsofourcapitalaccountmeasurearealwayshighlystatistically
significantandsubstantive.Asinthespecificationusinguncorrectedcor-
relations, neither the size nor the magnitude of the coefficients on Q in
table 4 is reduced by adding control variables (compared to matching
models in table 3). Higher correlations of output growth rates predict
higher equity market correlations, but the effect is not significant in all
models. Interest rate correlations are consistently significant, as is bi-
lateral trade.
Our results in tables 3 and 4 probably understate the extent to which
correlations have increased because of greater capital account openness.
Measuring capital account openness is not without problems, even with
the best indicators available. In the postwar period, for example, the
IMF’s standard measure (which indicates only if markets are open or
closed) is positively correlated with our measure. Where the more finely
graded CAPITAL measure adds some noise in the explanatory variable,
this would induce attrition bias. Also, we miss some of the countries
that liberalized only recently and whose equity markets do not have
a long history. A data set that included them would arguably contain
even more identifying variance and could show larger effects.
III. Robustness
Inthissection,weexaminetherobustnessofourmainresult.Wetestifa
handful of countries drive our result. Next, we turn to the stability of
effects by subperiod. Did the strength of the openness‐correlation
nexus increase over time? Finally, we examine if serial correlation in
Quinn and Voth 24ourexplanatoryvariableproduces an upwardbias in the estimatedsig-
nificance level.
The United States and the United Kingdom were the two dominant
financial markets during the last century and a half. They appear nu-
merous times in our country pairs. If they drove an important part of
our results, this could be cause for concern. How does omitting either or
both countries from the analysis influence the results? In table 5, we
examine the robustness of our findings to dropping the United States
and the United Kingdom from the sample.
Overall, we find that our results are highly robust to the omission of
the United States and the United Kingdom. The coefficient estimates for
average capital account openness are always positive and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The only exception is for the corrected cor-
relation coefficient in table 5, panel B, model 6, in which more than half
the sample is lost because of data limitations, and where the coefficient
is significant at the 0.05 level. The magnitude of the coefficients does
not change markedly. We find a range of 0.12–0.47 for the simple return
correlations and of 0.06–0.2 for the Forbes‐Rigobon corrected ones.
How stable are our results in different subperiods since 1890? Table 6
gives the results if we subdivide our data set into three broad periods:
1890–1917 to examine correlations in the last age of globalization, 1918–
53 for the long interwar period from World War I to the end of immediate
reconstruction, and 1954–2001, which covers the Bretton Woods period
and the second period of globalization.
For the period before 1918, we have to estimate without fixed effects,
since there is not enough variation over time to use a difference‐in‐
difference approach. For both the uncorrected and the FR corrected
coefficients, we find a positive effect of greater openness. The coefficient
is large, but since Q is not cardinal in nature, there is no meaningful
way to compare the coefficient on Q across periods. Growth rate corre-
lations once again emerge as significant, and trade, interest rate correla-
tions, and national income differences have the predicted sign even if
only growth rates emerge as significant when we use the uncorrected
specifications.
For the period of turmoil during the interwar period and imme-
diately following World War II, we find a statistically significant effect
of Q on both dependent variables. Bilateral trade surprisingly appears
negatively correlated with equity market comovements. Since the inter-
war period saw the collapse of the global trading system, we surmise
that the effects of the Great Depression are indirectly responsible for
this result.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27After 1955, we find large positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cients of capital account openness on both the corrected and uncorrected
correlations.
12 Trade appears important in the post–World War II period
and,intheFRcorrectedestimation,interestratecorrelations.Overall,we
find a high degree of consistency in our subperiods: independent of the
part of the twentieth century that we analyze, country pairs with more
open capital accounts saw their stock markets fluctuate in parallel to a
much higher extent.
Bertrand,Duflo,andMullainathan(2004)highlightthepotentialpitfalls
of difference‐in‐difference estimators. If an exogenous variable exhibits
serial correlation, the standard errors in typical fixed‐effects estimations
will be too small, leading us to reject the null of no effect too easily. The
problem will be more acute (i) the longer the time span covered, (ii) the
Table 6
Panel Regressions by Historical Subperiods: Financial Openness and Stock
Market Correlations

























































































Observations/pairs 15/6 709/19 1,440/120 15/6 709/19 1,440/120
Adjusted R
2 .28 .24 .50 .33 .22 .52
Note: WeestimateOLSregressionswithcontrolsofcapitalaccountopenness’seffectonthe
correlationof equity market returnsfora pairof countries. Thedependent variableis either
thecorrelationofthereturnsbetweenapairofcountries’equitymarkets(models1–3)orthe
correlation adjusted for volatility using the Forbes‐Rigobon correction (models 4–6). The
description of the control variables is found in table 1. OLS models 2, 3, 5, and 6 use pair
fixed effects, which are not reported to save space. Data are missing for the World War II
years in models 2 and 5. OLS models 1 and 4 have insufficient degrees of freedom to use
pair fixed effects. Results using trade instead of bilateral trade are substantively identical
but are not reported to save space. t‐statistics using panel‐corrected standard errors in pa-
rentheses are reported below the coefficient estimates (see Beck and Katz 1995). The obser-
vations are nonoverlapping 4‐year averages of the data for a given period.
*p‐value < .05.
**p‐value < .01.
Quinn and Voth 28greatertheserialcorrelationinthedependentvariable,and(iii)thegreater
the serial correlation of the exogenous variable. Since the autocorrelation
coefficient of the Forbes‐Rigobon corrected correlation variable is 0.37
(standard error 0.03) and of CAPITAL is 0.76 (standard error 0.019), there
is obvious scope for concern (although the general method of moments
system estimators do not suffer from this deficiency). Among other reme-
dies, Bertrand et al. suggest collapsing the data to a time‐averaged cross
section (i.e., abstracting from time variation). This strategy is particularly
powerfulin ourcase sinceallcountriesvarytheircapital marketopenness
overtimeand because the numberofcountry pairsislarge, giving the test
ah i g hd e g r e eo fp o w e r .
Hence, we regress
ρi ¼ C þ βQi þ γX′ i þ ε; ð3Þ
where ρi is the average correlation coefficient (corrected or uncorrected)
foreachcountrypairi,QistheQuinn‐Toyodameasureofcapitalaccount
openness, and X′ is a vector of control. Independent of specification, we
find a large and significant effect of openness on return correlations.
In the baseline specification 1 in panels A and B of table 7, the coeffi-
cient on capital account openness is large and significant. So is the cor-
relation of growth rates. The controls for trade volume are in general
significant where we use the uncorrected correlations as the dependent
variable. Including them causes the growth rate correlations to decline
in magnitude or even to change sign (specification 5, panel A). Interest
rate correlations always exhibit positive covariance with equity market
returns, and the coefficients are statistically significant in three of four
specifications. National income differences appear to reduce correla-
tions in equity markets, but the result is not stable across specifications.
Even in the specification that yields the smallest coefficient on Q in
panel A, increasing openness by 40 points (equivalent to the observed
increase in mean openness in our sample between 1954 and 1998) raises
the correlation coefficient of stock markets by 0.2. Overall, according to
the results from the time‐averaged cross section, we can account for
one‐third of the variation in correlation coefficients with openness.
Panel B uses the FR corrected correlations as a dependent variable.
Coefficients on openness are generally smaller, as we would expect: the
dependent variable hasamore limited range,by construction. The signifi-
cance of our findings is generally not affected, even if the t‐statistic in one
ofourfinalspecificationsdropsto3.2.Theeffectoftradeisnotasapparent
in the FR corrected specification, and growth correlations appear to have
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 29Table 7
Cross‐Section Regressions: Financial Openness and Stock Market Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Dependent Variable: Return














































Observations 120 73 120 73 120
Adjusted R
2 .40 .52 .45 .56 .62
B. Dependent Variable: Return‐FR














































Observations 120 73 120 73 120
Adjusted R
2 .20 .23 .21 .29 .33
Note: In this table, we estimate the cross‐sectional determinants of equity market correla-
tions between a pair of countries. The dependent variable is either the correlation of the
returns between a pair of countries’ equity markets (panel A) or the correlations adjusted
for volatility using the Forbes‐Rigobon correction (panel B). These OLS models are cross‐
sectional models with heteroskedasticity‐consistent matrices. t‐statistics are in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. Sixteen countries in 120 country pairs are represented in
models 1,3, and 5.Because of data limitations, models 2 and 4 contain data for 16countries
and 73 country pairs. The data are averaged across all periods.
*p‐value < .05.
**p‐value < .01.a similareffect. Overall, there is little evidence that understated standard
errors in the standard difference‐in‐difference setup are responsible for
the significant coefficients we obtained in the panel estimation.
IV. Discussion
In this section, we discuss two issues that arise—causality and the mag-
nitude of effects. Causality is a crucial issue not because of reverse cau-
sation. It is unlikely that higher equity market comovement may have
directly lowered barriers to free capital movement. Omitted variables
are a more serious concern. What if a third factor is simultaneously
driving up correlations and equity market comovement? We have tried
to control for some factors that come to mind, such as bilateral trade
and the comovement of interest rates. Yet controlling for these factors
will succeed only if we capture the transmission mechanism perfectly.
This is not likely.
Instead,weemphasizetwoaspects.First,themaindriverofchangesin
capitalaccountopennesswaspolitics.Inthetaleoftwocountriesthatwe
mentioned before, the key steps in Britain’s road to an open capital ac-
count are easy to describe. After Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979,
opening the capital account became a priority for the new Conservative
government.Restrictionsonforeignexchangeandforeignassetholdings
weredismantledalmostovernight.Theriseinopennesscausedbysucha
sudden change in policy is unlikely to reflect other, unmeasured factors,
whose influence could at best influence correlations slowly.
One of the key steps along the path to greater openness came in the
run‐up to EMU. Countries such as France and Italy, which had retained
numerous capital controls, opened up their accounts. On average, coun-
tries joining EMU saw their openness rise by 28 points on the Quinn‐
Toyoda scale between 1993 and 2000. If we use EMU membership as
an instrument for capital account openness, we should be able to side-
step some of the concerns about endogeneity.
13 We estimate for the post-
war sample, including data from 1945 onward. The simple coefficient
(t‐statistic) on the CAPITAL variable is 0.59 (27.1) in a fixed‐effects model.
UsingEMUforthefirststage,weobtainanR
2of0.37andanFof7.5.EMU
enters positively and significantly. The Stock‐Yogo (2002) test unam-
biguouslyrejectsthepossibilityofweakidentification.Intheinstrumental
variablesequation,thecoefficientonopennessreaches1.1(19.6),whichis
large and highly significant. To the extent that we can solve endogeneity
problems by instrumenting with EMU membership, our argument that
the relationship uncovered is causal receives additional support.
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 31Our results in tables 4 and 5 probably understate the extent to which
correlations have increased because of greater capital account openness.
Measuring capital account openness is not without problems, even with
the best indicators available. In the postwar period, for example, the
IMF’s standard measure (which indicates only if markets are open or
closed) is positively correlated with our measure. Where the more finely
graded CAPITAL measure adds some noise in the explanatory variable,
this induces attrition bias. Also, we miss some of the countries that liber-
alized only recently and whose equity markets do not have a long his-
tory. A data set that included them would arguably contain even more
identifying variance and could show larger effects.
There is, however, one factor that tends in the opposite direction. The
attainable level of diversification with fully open capital accounts will
be larger than our study implies. We focus on a stable set of countries for
the last century. However, Goetzmann et al. (2005) show that the addi-
tional reduction in risk from adding a large number of smaller markets
can be substantial. As the number of countries (and stock markets) has
surged in the last 100 years, our results will be too pessimistic compared
to the full range of investment choices available.
One important limitation of our analysis is the fact that we cannot
address the country versus industry factor debate. Roll (1992) found a
large role for industry composition in explaining comovements between
country indices. Cavaglia, Brightman, and Aked (2000) called into ques-
tion Heston and Rouwenhorst’s (1994) result that country factors are de-
cisive. In recent work, Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2005) conclude that
industryfactorsmatteredonlyforarelativelyshortperiodandthatcoun-
try factors overall remain crucial.
14
What reason is there to believe that capital chasing diversification op-
portunities is responsible for the positive relationship between openness
and correlations? We controlled for changes in economic fundamentals,
interest ratecorrelations,and the like, but the argument sofarhas worked
by process of elimination. A more direct test should examine how flows
react to past correlations and how correlations in turn react to flows. Data
limitations make such a direct test impossible. The IMF’s Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey has collected data on bilateral asset position
including equity investments, but it covers only the period 1997–2003.
We use the information for 2002 since this is the last year in which final
estimates are available, and the coverage is broad. Since stocks at the be-
ginning are known to have been very low overall, existing stocks in 2002
must largely be the result of flows (and appreciation) over the postwar
period.
Quinn and Voth 32Ifourargumentiscorrect,thenthegreaterbilateralholdingsaretoday,
the highercorrelationsshould beaswell.Also,greateropenness onaver-
age and large increases in openness should have resulted in increasing
bilateral holdings. Both predictions are borne out by the data. Table 8 ex-
amines the empirical regularities. Countries with greater bilateral hold-
ings saw a marked and statistically significant rise in correlations. Also,
greater average openness is strongly correlated with higher bilateral
holdings (specifications 2 and 3). Correlations in 1953 are negatively re-
lated to the value of bilateral equity holdings, but at −0.025, the effect is
weak and insignificant. Correlations in 1997 vary positively with the log
of bilateral holdings (0.57, significant at the 1% level).
V. Conclusions
During much of the postwar period, capital flows between advanced
capitalistcountrieswereanything butfree.Correlationswerelow,butthis
did not indicate unexploited investment opportunities. Few investors
wereallowedtomovefundsfromonejurisdictiontoanother.Ouranalysis
Table 8
























Observations 120 120 120
Adjusted R
2 .12 .11 .14
Effect of moving from the
25th to the 75th percentile
of the exogenous variable










Free Flows, Limited Diversification 33suggests that capital controls did not just stand in the way of exploiting
diversificationopportunities.Toalargeextent,theycreatedanillusionthat
they were large in the first place. The mean (uncorrected) correlation dur-
ing the period 1950–54 in ourdata set was 0.26. By 1998–2001, it had risen
to 0.63. We conclude that policy changes, and not only greater trade or in-
terest rate linkages per se, played a decisive role in driving them up.
15
Using a set of 120 country pairs over the last century shows that liberali-
zation has tended to increase the covariance of stock market returns. We
also report robust evidence that divergent capital account regulatory re-
gimes between a pair of countries decrease correlations. This means that
the world described in the seminal papers by Grubel (1968) and Levy and
Sarnat (1970) looked promising for international investors precisely be-
cause it was de facto and de jure nearly impossible to invest across bor-
ders.
16 Thus, many academic studies and practitioners’ beliefs about the
benefits of international investing may have been too sanguine—and the
home bias inferred from investors’ portfolios much too large.
17
Our paper also contributes to the debate about the nature of financial
globalization over the last century. Since corrected and uncorrected cor-
relations diverge strongly, we demonstrate that an important part of the
increase in actual equity return correlations has been the result of higher
volatility. Diversification benefits are much less today than they were in
the more distant past because of high volatility. Yet even after correcting
fortheupwardbiasalongthelinesofForbesandRigobon(2002),wefind
that equity return correlations today are substantially higher than they
were a century ago. Interdependence has therefore also grown, but to a
smaller extent.
The nineteenth century is widely viewed as a golden age of globalized
capital markets. In many dimensions, capital flows across borders and
the degree of market integration was as high 100 years ago as it is today
(Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). Our findings suggest that global capital mar-
kets before1914weresuperiortothepresent‐dayequivalents inoneregard
in particular. When assessing opportunities for risk reduction because of
low return correlations, actual levels of capital account openness have to
be taken into account. In this regard, the nineteenth century combined
remarkable levels of capital mobility with only modestly high correla-
tions, whereas the most recent era of globalization has brought about a
large, rapid, and sustained reduction in diversification opportunities.
The waning of international diversification opportunities is probably
drivenbyanumberoffactors.Greateropenness,thefactorwehighlighted
here, was the result of policy changes following the collapse of Bretton
Woods. In addition, the organizational structure of financial intermediaries
Quinn and Voth 34haschanged,ashasthemedianinvestorinmanymarkets.JohnMaynard
Keynes described investors in the first wave of globalization as “inhabi-
tant(s)ofLondon(who)could…bytelephone,sipping…morningteain
bed,adventurehiswealthinthenaturalresourcesandnewenterprisesof
any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in
their prospective fruits and advantages” (1922, 11–12). By the late twen-
tieth century, they have given way to professionals who are managing
portfolios on behalf of others; many of these firms operate worldwide
and are advised by global investment banks that also use a single trading
book for their proprietary desks. Shocks to net worth, and the resulting
changes in risk appetite, now simultaneously drive changes in equity
values from Toyko to Johannesburg. They may account for a large share
ofthebiggestpricemoves(MorrisandShin2004).Astheinfluenceoflocal
factors has declined, global ones play an increasing role in the pricing of
shares. The next stage of our project will examine if greater openness to
global flows has systematically increased the variability of stock returns.
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2. In related work that examines the effects of capital account liberalization on macroeco-
nomic stability, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2004) document a reduction in volatility.
3. In a similar vein, Dickinson (2000) examines the relative contributions of macroeco-
nomic factors and of financial globalization on the cointegration of stock markets.
4. Lewis (2006) also documents that for U.S. investors, the benefits from holding for-
eign stocks cross‐listed in the United States have declined sharply.
5. After 1979, the name of the annual report changed to Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, and after 1989, to Exchange Arrangements and Ex-
change Restrictions.
6. These are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United States.
7. See Eichengreen (2002) and Kose et al. (2006) for reviews. Recent studies in finance
and economics using the Quinn‐Toyoda measure have examined whether capital account
opennessinfluencescorporatetaxrates(Schwarz2007;Devereux,Lockwood,andRedoano
Free Flows, Limited Diversification 352008), currency risk premia (Lustig and Verdelhan 2007), currencycrises (Ranciere, Tornell,
and Westerman 2008), economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005; Quinn and
Toyoda 2008), financial integration (Imbs 2006), growth opportunities and market integra-
tion (Bekaert et al. 2007), and industry growth (Vlachos and Waldenstrom 2005).
8. It is not possible to measure capital account openness from 1940 to 1945 since the
main data sources used to construct it either cease to function (League of Nations after
December 1939) or have not yet formed (IMF). Information about financial openness for
many countries from 1946 onward is found in IMF (1949).
9. Variable codes for the equity indices used are available from the authors on request.
10. A problem with the Forbes‐Rigobon correction is that it may use data from the fu-
ture to correct the past data and does so across differing regimes. For example, the modal
year for the minimum variance among the 120 country pairs is 1962–65: 33 pairs experi-
ence their lowest variance then. For these 33 pairs, data from 1962–65 are used to adjust
datafrom,e.g.,1890–93,1958–61,and1998–2001,whichrepresentverydifferentregimes.
Moreover, economic actors presumably adjusted current behavior in light of past values of
variance, leaving the question of whether the adjustment is exogenous. Corsetti, Pericoli,
and Sbracia (2002) argue that the Forbes‐Rigobon method overstates the upward bias. To
the extent that we still find significant effects even with the large correction of the Forbes‐
Rigobon method, we are establishing a lower bound on the true effect.
11. The British case is examined in Taylor and Tonks (1989).
12. Since we cannot be certain that a rise by 10 points on the Quinn‐Toyoda scale should
be expected to have the same impact on correlations, independent of starting levels, com-
paring magnitudes directly is not sensible.
13. WethankPhilipLaneforthissuggestion.Duringtherun‐uptoEMU,someinvestment
firms introduced pan‐European trading desks. Some observers expected that a continent‐
wide equity market would soon come into existence. To the extent that financial market par-
ticipants changed their behavior because of EMU, our instrument will not be valid.
14. If we could correct for the Internet effect identified by Brooks and Del Negro (2004),
we would observe less of a rise in the corrected correlations.
15. Our conclusions differ in part from those in, say, Lewis (2006) because we examine
a much longer time period than the last 20 years and a wider set of countries.
16. Levy and Sarnat (1970) conclude that, since the optimum country portfolio does not
containallcountriesintheworld,theremustbesubstantialbarrierstofreecapitalmovement.
17. We focus on a stable set of countries for the last century. As Goetzmann et al. (2005)
show, the additional reduction in risk from adding a large numberof smaller markets can be
substantial. As the number of countries (and stock markets) has surged in the last 100 years,
ourresultsmaybetoopessimisticcomparedtothefullrangeofinvestmentchoicesavailable.
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